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Abstract 
Crisis communication is an integral aspect of public relations that can have either positive or 
negative repercussions based upon the action that an organization responds. The manner in which an 
organization handles a crisis determines financial implications that may ensue, public perception and 
reputation of the organization, as well as the overall success or failure of the organization in the future. 
Consequently, Timothy Coombs asserts that the best crisis communication practice is to respond quickly, 
accurately, and consistently (Coombs, 2010: 28). Other scholars concur and add supplementary 
techniques which emphasize preparedness and responsibility.  
The present study was conducted to identify models of best practices for crisis management and 
to apply these models to analyze the effectiveness of BP’s response to the 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill. 
A content analysis of 164 articles from three newspapers, The Times Picayune, The New York Times, and 
The Herald (United Kingdom), was conducted to examine how BP responded to the crisis in the Gulf, as 
well as to compare differences in coverage of the crisis and response among the three newspapers.  
Results reveal that BP’s response incorporated both best practices of crisis communication, as 
well as crisis responses that could be categorized as unethical.  Such unethical responses included evasion 
of responsibility, denial, and scapegoating, while effective crisis communication tactics consisted of 
updating the public in a clear, concise manner. Further results and implications for international crisis 
communication practices will be described.  
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CHAPTER ONE: RATIONALE 
Introduction to Crisis Communication 
Crises are inevitable. It is the manner in which an organization handles such crises that 
determines how the public will respond. When an organization’s negligent actions cause harm to 
humans, the environment, or the economy, public outrage is unavoidable and deserved. 
Therefore, it is in an organization’s best interest to react responsibly in order to prevent future 
harm. No matter how much an organization prepares in advance for a crisis or how efficiently it 
responds after a crisis has occurred, the possibility of reputational damage or serious financial 
loss still exists. Therefore, crisis communication in the field of public relations is an area that is 
essential to the success of any organization. Understanding how to plan for and effectively 
manage crises is pivotal.  
A contemporary example of a crisis facing an organization is the 2010 BP oil spill in the 
Gulf of Mexico. This particular crisis began on April 20, 2010 with an explosion and fire on the 
BP-licensed Transocean drilling rig Deepwater Horizon, followed two days later by the sinking 
of the Deepwater Horizon rig and reports of a five-mile-long oil slick. On April 24, oil was 
officially found leaking from BP’s well in the Gulf, spawning a flurry of governmental, 
environmental, and media attention. Over the course of several months, the government, 
scientists, environmentalists, and Gulf residents fought to combat the leaking well and reduce the 
impact that the constant flow of oil would have upon the economy of the Gulf and the ecology of 
the area. Meanwhile, BP executives struggled to respond to the crisis appropriately, protect 
corporate stock and profits, manage changes in leadership, prepare for inevitable litigation, as 
well as salvage its public reputation. After waging a full-on battle with the well, BP announced 
that it was officially sealed on September 19, but not without continued scrutiny from a critical 
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public audience (Alter, 2010; Casale, 2010; Crowley, 2010; Dudley, 2010; Gandel, 2010; Gray 
and Walsh, 2010; Guardian.co.uk, 2010; Hayes, 2010; Houck, 2010; Klein, 2010; Nijhuis, 2010; 
Smith, 2010; Weber, 2010).  
The BP oil spill serves as the focus for the present study, as it offers a contemporary case 
for viewing corporate crisis communication in action. Before corporate crisis communication can 
be studied empirically, however, it is important to understand this topic more broadly: to define 
and describe what constitutes a crisis and its stages; to outline relevant theoretical frameworks; 
and finally, to provide a rubric for identifying unethical and ethical crisis communication 
practices. 
 
Defining a Crisis 
In order for an organization to engage in crisis communication, it must first understand 
what a crisis entails. In The Handbook of Crisis Communication, W. Timothy Coombs defines a 
crisis as “the perception of an unpredictable event that threatens important expectancies of 
stakeholders and can seriously impact an organization’s performance and generate negative 
outcomes” (Coombs, 2010: 19).  
According to Coombs, there is no universally accepted definition of crisis; and while 
many other definitions of crisis exist, some commonalities are prevalent in all definitions. Extant 
research reveals that a crisis includes some degree of uncertainty, regarding when it will arise 
and what the outcome will be. L. Barton in Crisis in Organizations II defines a crisis as “an 
incident that is unexpected, negative, and overwhelming” (Barton 2001: 2). Seeger, Sellnow, and 
Ulmer concur that a crisis unexpected, and add that a crisis is often perceived as a threat to an 
organization’s goals (Seeger, Sellnow, and Ulmer 1998: 233). Additionally, research shows that 
Communicating During Crisis   10 
 
a crisis disrupts normal business within an organization, as well as threatens its reputation and 
financial livelihood (Coombs, 2007: 1; Jaques, 2007: 147-148; Williams and Olaniran: 6). Crises 
have also been referred to as “turning points” for organizations due to the pervasive impact that 
they can have upon operations and livelihoods (Fink 1986: 15; Regester 1989: 38).  
Coombs points out that crises can have either positive or negative outcomes and that 
“opportunity and threat are more a function of the outcomes of crisis management rather than a 
defining characteristic of crisis” (Coombs, 2010: 18-19). This relates to his understanding of 
crisis, crisis management, and crisis communication as interconnected and progressive terms. 
Coombs asserts that the crisis must come before crisis management, which in turn is followed by 
crisis communication (Coombs, 2010: 17-18). Crisis management is defined by Coombs as “a set 
of factors designed to combat crises and to lessen the actual damages inflicted,” as well as seeks 
to minimize negative effects upon the organization and stakeholders (Coombs, 2010: 20). 
Preventative measures, crisis management plans, and post-crisis evaluations are integral 
components of crisis management, which can be divided into pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis 
stages (Coombs, 2010: 20).  
An aspect of each stage of crisis management is the acquiring and publicizing of 
information surrounding the crisis, which can be considered crisis communication. Coombs 
broadly defines crisis communication as “the collection, processing, and dissemination of 
information required to address a crisis situation” (Coombs 2010: 20). Actions regarding crisis 
communication can be understood within the three categories of crisis management. Crisis 
communication in pre-crisis includes “collecting information about crisis risks, making decisions 
about how to manage potential crises, and training people who will be involved in the crisis 
management process” (Coombs 2010: 20). During the time of an actual crisis, crisis 
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communication entails collecting and processing information surrounding the crisis in order to 
make a decision about what course of action to take, along with the creation and dissemination of 
messages to the public regarding the situation. “Dissecting the crisis management effort, 
communicating necessary changes to individuals, and providing follow-up crisis messages” 
comprises crisis communication during the post-crisis stage (Coombs 2010: 20).   
  Understanding the relationship between crisis management and crisis communication is 
essential in order to enact preventative measures against crises, to devise a plan of action for 
when crises arise, to execute effective strategies to remedy crises, as well as to evaluate the 
effects of crises and decisions made along the way. Furthermore, knowledge regarding the array 
of crises that may develop, underlying theories to guide crisis management, and effective and 
unsuccessful crisis communication and management strategies is beneficial in order to react to 
crises in such a manner that is advantageous for an organization’s stability and reputation, as 
well as for the public.   
 
Types of Crises 
As crisis communication has developed as a field of study within public relations, a 
typology has emerged. Hearit and Roberson list several types of crises in the Handbook of Risk 
and Crisis Communication. These include allegations, crises in public perception, natural 
disasters, product or service crises, terrorist attacks, economic crises, human resource crises, 
industrial crises, oil and chemical spills, transportation disasters, scandals and illegalities, 
accidents, product safety incidents, and social irresponsibility (Hearit and Roberson, 2010: 543-
545). For each type of crises, different crisis management and communication strategies should 
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be employed. In order to understand which tactic would be most effective in remedying the 
crisis, it is important to understand what each particular type of crisis entails.  
According to Ware and Linkugel, an allegation is “an attack on a person’s character,” but 
it can also be applied to an entire organization when a claim or accusation is made regarding the 
organization, its decisions, or its reputation (Ware and Linkugel 1973, 274). Furthermore, an 
allegation may be brought against an individual or organization, which may prove to be true or 
false. Because it is based in assertions and can be detrimental to an organization if false 
allegations are brought against an organization, Ware and Linkugel assert that this type of crisis 
seems “to demand a direct response” (Ware and Linkugel 1973, 274). Roper claims that 
allegations jeopardize an organization’s legitimacy, as the public is unsure of the truth of the 
situation. “Defense of actions or statements that have impugned and organization’s legitimacy 
must be addressed quickly if an organization is to survive,” according to Roper (Roper, 2005). 
Hearit argues that if allegations brought against an organization are true, “a corporate apologia, 
which is a ‘response to a social legitimization crisis,’” may prove effective in restoring the 
organization’s image within the public sphere (Hearit 1995: 3).  
Another type of crisis described in the Handbook of Risk and Crisis Communication is 
scandals and illegalities. Hearit and Roberson claim that this form of crisis “refers to those 
incidents in which there is a violation of a social code,” such as an executive whose private 
indiscretion has drawn negative attention to the entire organization or involved legal attention 
(Hearit and Roberson 2010: 544). Because guilt is generally contained to a small group of 
individuals, Hearit and Roberson assert that scandals and illegalities “often can be dealt with 
cleanly and directly” (Hearit and Roberson 2010: 545).  
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Accidents are another type of crises discussed by Hearit and Roberson. Accidents entail 
an unexpected outcome, in which “lives are lost or the environment is despoiled” (Hearit, 2001). 
The example of the infamous Exxon Valdez oil spill is described.    
Hearit and Roberson contrast the dramatic occurrence of accidents with more long-term 
product safety incidents, which unfold gradually over time. According to Hearit and Roberson, 
most of these product safety incidents involve legal action, in which organizations that are 
named in class action lawsuits have an evident “need to defend their reputation” (Hearit and 
Roberson 2010: 545).  
Another type of crisis that is discussed in the Handbook of Risk and Crisis 
Communication is social irresponsibility. During this crisis, “corporate actors are seen to act in 
ways that violate publicly held social values, speak in politically incorrect ways, or have 
otherwise behaved in such a way as to give fuel to special interest or advocacy groups looking to 
‘make an issue’ with their enemies” (Hearit and Roberson 2010: 545). Handling crises of social 
irresponsibility is similar to management of scandals and illegalities, which also violates social 
codes, and can be dealt with in a direct approach. Furthermore, Burnett adds to this list with 
specific types of industrial crises, which include sudden market shifts, top management 
succession, hostile takeovers, regulation/deregulation, and adverse international events (Burnett, 
1998: 478).  
 
Major Theoretical Models Guiding Crisis Communication 
 In addition to the classification of crises, theories have been developed and applied to 
guide crisis communication. The most prominent theories emerging in research include 
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attribution theory, situational crisis communication theory (SCCT), contingency theory, and 
apologia.  
 
Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) 
According to Coombs, attribution theory is a social-psychological theory that “attempts 
to explain how people make sense of events,” especially why they occurred (Coombs 2010: 37). 
This theory explains how people attribute responsibility based on limited evidence, tending to 
attach blame to a specific person involved in an event (internal) or to environmental factors 
(external) (Coombs, 2010: 37). According to Bernard Weiner, during crises, this theory is 
evident when stakeholders attribute crisis responsibility upon either the organization itself or 
external factors, which in turn affects behaviors directed toward the organization on behalf of the 
public (Weiner, 1986). This relates to the way in which an organization may evade responsibility 
in a crisis situation, as well as the perception that the public develops of the organization based 
on the degree to which the organization accepts responsibility (and how quickly it chooses to do 
so). Jolly and Mowen assert that in crisis situations, “the perception of social responsibility in the 
response is facilitated by a fast response and the government commenting that this response was 
socially responsible” (Jolly and Mowen 1985; Mowen et.al. 1981). Additionally, Bradford and 
Garrett claim that “the nature of the crisis situation influences the effectiveness of the response” 
with the public being more forgiving of a less socially deemed severe crises (Bradford and 
Garrett, 1995).  
 Directly associated to attribution theory is situational crisis communication theory 
(SCCT), which claims that attributions made by stakeholders affect how they interact with the 
organization (Coombs 1995; Coombs and Holladay 1996; Schwartz 2008). This is an audience-
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centered theory that aims to explain public perception and behavior during crises. As the public 
develops perceptions of the manner in which the organization accepts or evades responsibility 
during a crisis, the organization’s reputation is threatened (Barton 2001; Dowling 2002). Coombs 
asserts that crises have the potential to “generate negative affect and behavioral intentions toward 
an organization” (Coombs 2010: 38).  
SCCT describes factors that the public takes into consideration when forming their 
approval or disproval of an organization’s social responsibility and management of a crisis. 
Coombs explains that the initial step is determining crisis type, as well as level of attributions of 
crisis responsibility and threat posed by a crisis. These three types include: victim (low crisis 
responsibility/threat), accident (minimal crisis responsibility/threat), and intentional (strong crisis 
responsibility/threat) (Coombs 2010: 39). The second step of SCCT perception formulation 
occurs when the public considers the two intensifying factors, crisis history and prior reputation 
(Coombs 2010: 39). If the organization has a past history and reputation that is prone to crisis 
mismanagement, attitudes and perceptions of the organization among the public will likely 
suffer, as will the organization’s reputation.  
SCCT also explains the role that behavioral intentions and moods/emotions play in crisis 
outcomes and public perception of an organization’s crisis management efforts. A concept that 
emerges regarding behavior intentions is negative word-of-mouth. When the public is 
disappointed, angered, or does not support action, or lack of action, taken by an organization 
during a crisis, individuals begin “relaying negative messages to others about the organization in 
crisis,” which further harms the organization’s reputation (Coombs 2010: 39-40).  
Additionally, SCCT purports that there are four primary crisis response strategies, which 
include denial, diminishing, rebuilding, and reinforcing (Coombs 2010: 40). Under this theory, 
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denial strategies “attempt to prove the organization had no responsibility for the crisis,” whereas 
diminishing strategies acknowledge that the organization is somewhat responsible but “seek to 
minimize the organization’s crisis responsibility and/or reduce the perceived seriousness of the 
crisis” (Coombs 2010: 40). Rebuilding strategies “seek to improve perceptions of the 
organization through compensation and/or apologies” (Coombs 2010: 41). Meanwhile, 
reinforcing strategies “try to add positive information about the organization by praising others 
(ingratiation) and/or reminding people of past good works by the organization (bolstering)” 
(Coombs 2010: 41).  
 
Contingency Theory 
Instead of focusing on the public’s perception of an organization during crises, 
contingency theory, attempts to describe the organization’s approach when dealing with its 
stakeholders during crisis. The pivotal variable of contingency theory is stance, which Coombs 
defines as “how an organization responds to competition and conflicts with other parties” 
(Coombs 2010: 42). These stances are placed on a continuum, ranging from pure advocacy to 
pure accommodation, depending on the circumstance (Cameron, Jin, and Pang, 2010: 528, 533; 
Coombs, 2010: 42). In this context, “advocacy is when an organization argues for its own 
interests, while accommodation is when the organization makes concessions to the other parties” 
(Coombs 2010: 42). An organization’s choice to enact advocacy or accommodation strategies 
varies depending upon a particular crisis and the context in which it takes place. Additionally, 
contingency theory is rooted in over 80 other variables that “help predict what stance should be 
used in a particular situation” (Coombs 2010: 42). Variables can be classified as either 
predisposed, which represent default stances, or can be situational variables, which are in turn 
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divided into five external factors and seven internal factors (Shin et al. 2006). Contingency 
theory hinges on the relationships between these variables in understanding the stance and action 
an organization assumes during a crisis.  
 
Apologia 
Apologia is a rhetorical framework that directs crisis communication strategies. Effective 
apologia is used to restore damaged credibility and occurs when an organization apologizes to 
the public and involved parties, as well as takes responsibility for the crisis. Corporate apologia 
is executed by an organization to defend its reputation and restore social legitimacy, which is the 
“consistency between organizational values and stakeholder values” (Coombs 2010: 30). 
According to Hearit in Crisis Management by Apology, an ethical apology must be truthful, 
sincere, timely, voluntary, address all stakeholders, and is performed in an appropriate context 
(Hearit 2006: 64). 
Furthermore, Fediuk, Coombs, and Botero address audience perception of a crisis. 
Fediuk, Coombs, and Botero assert that crisis incidents that are perceived as personally relevant 
lead to greater cognitive processing of the crisis on behalf of the public (Botero, Coombs, and 
Fediuk, 2010: 643). They claim that individuals will perceive a crisis as more severe when it 
results in a large amount of damage, as well as when it is perceived to impact personal goals 
(Botero, Coombs, and Fediuk, 2010: 643).  
 
Crisis Stages and Implications 
While there may be several different theories and strategies to guide crisis 
communication, extant research shows that there are only three main stages that construct the 
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crisis communication model. These three stages are pre-crisis planning and preparation 
(preventative), crisis response and management (active), and post-crisis repair and learning 
(reflective) (Burnett, 1998; Coombs, 2010: 20; Fearn-Banks, 2002; Jaques, 2007: 155-158). 
These stages are important to consider, as effective communication strategies should differ as a 
function of the crisis timeline.  
The pre-crisis phase is anticipatory and preventative in nature and includes scanning the 
environment for potential risks and possible crises (Coombs 2010: 26; Burnett 1998; Penrose, 
2000). According to Coombs, “early identification permits time for analysis and strategizing” 
(Coombs 2010: 26). After scanning the environment, preventative planning takes place, which 
includes establishing information and warning systems, as well as assigning roles and 
responsibilities, testing and training of crisis communication plans, and conducting simulations 
(Burnett, 1998; Coombs, 2010: 26; Jaques, 2007: 155-158). 
The second phase in the crisis communication model is response to and management of 
the actual crisis. During this phase, a crisis management response is chosen and implemented, 
damage is mitigated, as well as stakeholders and the media are informed and managed (Jaques 
2007: 156). This phase also entails targeting messages to the public and handling any negative 
publicity in order to salvage reputation (Burnett 1998). 
 The last phase in the model is the post-crisis phase, which is reflective and includes 
continuation of crisis communication, reputation repair, and organizational evaluation and 
learning (Coombs 2010: 45-46). During the post-crisis phase, operational recovery, financial 
costs, share price protection, and business momentum are addressed, as well as any litigation or 
injury or death investigations managed. The media and the public should be continuously 
informed and the manner in which the crisis was handled is scrutinized and evaluated. 
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Additionally, the crisis communication plan is adapted and implemented for future use if 
necessary (Jaques 2007: 157-158). 
 
Action and Strategies in Crisis Communication 
 According to Sellnow, when crises do strike, organizations follow one of three general 
paths: inaction or no response, routine solutions that draw upon pre-crisis planning, or original 
solutions that are created specifically for a crisis (Sellnow, 1993: 31). Sellnow and Seeger assert 
that “while routine responses to crisis, such as blaming and firing individuals, can salvage an 
organization’s legitimacy, original solutions that signal change within an organization can 
‘enhance a perception of preventative, long-term change and renewed social legitimacy’” 
(Sellnow and Seeger, 1989: 17). This claim implies that original solutions, created specifically 
for a particular crisis, may serve as the best path of action. 
 
Unethical Crisis Management 
Within these three overarching options are a variety of strategies that may be executed by 
an organization facing a crisis. While it is in an organization’s best interest to respond ethically 
in a time of crisis, many practices that organizations employ are unethical. Research reveals that 
such unethical strategies include attack of the accuser, denial, scapegoating, justification, 
compensation, ingratiation, victimage, evasion of responsibility, framing, bolstering, 
minimization, differentiation, transcendence, as well as mortification and staged apology 
(Benoit, 1997; Canel and Sanders, 2010; Coombs, 2007; Falkenheimer and Heide, 2006: 9; 
Maresh and Williams, 2010: 286).  
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In order to comprehend how these tactics could be perceived as unethical or could be 
potentially detrimental to an organization, it is necessary to understand their meanings. 
According to Coombs in “Crisis Management and Communication,” attack of the accuser occurs 
when the organization or crisis manager confronts the person or group claiming that something is 
wrong with the organization. Denial occurs when the organization under fire asserts that no crisis 
exists. When scapegoating takes place, the organization or crisis manager blames an individual 
or group outside of the organization for the crisis.  
Rather than turning to external sources, justification occurs when the organization tries to 
minimize the perceived damage caused by the crisis by claiming or attempting to prove that a 
particular act or response was reasonable. Minimization also seeks to downplay the seriousness 
of an act or response conducted in order to ensure that public perception of such act or crisis is 
more favorable. Differentiation attempts to minimize the offensiveness of a particular act or 
crisis as well by comparing it to other similar crises or responses that are assumed to be much 
more unethical or poorly managed (Benoit, 1997; Canel and Sanders, 2010; Coombs, 2007; 
Falkenheimer and Heide, 2006; Maresh and Williams, 2010).  
Ingratiation, another unethical crisis communication response, can be understood as an 
organization’s effort to gain favor with the public through deliberate efforts, particularly by 
portraying itself and its actions in a positive light in order to gain favor/support among others. 
Closely related to ingratiation is bolstering, which occurs when an organization emphasizes its 
good actions or responses, as well as its past history with crisis and its reputation, in order to 
overshadow bad responses (Benoit, 1997; Canel and Sanders, 2010; Coombs, 2007; 
Falkenheimer and Heide, 2006; Maresh and Williams, 2010).  
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Victimage, which is another PR strategy that can be considered unethical, occurs when 
the organization in the midst of a crisis portrays itself as the victim of a particular crisis rather 
than accepting any degree of responsibility for it. This ties in with evasion of responsibility, in 
which an organization may claim that their response to the crisis was in response to another act 
(provocation), that a particular event occurred because a lack of information or ability 
(defeasibility), that an act or the crisis as a whole was a mishap (accident), or that an act or 
response was originally executed with good intentions. In any of these instances, the 
organization offers an excuse or rationale for their decisions, responses, or actions rather than 
accepting responsibility for them or the crisis (Benoit, 1997; Coombs, 2007).    
Transcendence is another unethical crisis communication strategy in which an 
organization draws attention to particular issues that are considered more important in order to 
justify an act or response pursued during a crisis. This is done to downplay a negatively 
perceived act by framing it in reference to other acts or responses considered more worthy or 
important (Benoit, 1997; Coombs, 2007; Falkenheimer and Heide, 2006). 
 Three other crisis communication strategies, mortification, compensation, and staged 
apology, may be perceived as beneficial tactics for an organization to perform, yet when 
examining each closer, crisis communication scholars have found these strategies typically are 
executed with unethical intentions. Compensation, or reimbursing victims of the crisis, may be 
the right course of action to take from a legal standpoint, but this strategy can be regarded as 
unethical when money is given instead of a true apology by the organization, as well as can serve 
as a form of evasion of responsibility. Mortification occurs when an organization expresses 
regret for a specific act or response and asks forgiveness, yet does not accept responsibility or 
apologize for the entire situation or crisis as a whole. With this strategy, an organization 
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acknowledges its wrongdoing or mistake regarding a particular act, but still evades responsibility 
for the crisis and fails to offer an apology. In some instances, organizations will execute a staged 
apology (Benoit, 1997; Canel and Sanders, 2010; Coombs, 2007; Falkenheimer and Heide, 2009; 
Maresh and Williams, 2010).  While issuing an apology seems ethical, when an organization 
does so to mislead or create sympathy for itself to divert public attention, it is disingenuous and 
unethical. 
 
Best Practices for Crisis Communication 
 While many unethical options exist and are frequently used by organizations in crises, 
extensive research has been conducted to determine best practices in crisis communication as 
well. These are agreed-upon practices that are not only effective in managing crises, but also are 
ethical. Coombs asserts that the best crisis communication practice is to respond quickly, 
accurately, and consistently (Coombs, 2010: 28). Failing to respond quickly “lets others provide 
the information that will frame how the crisis will be perceived by stakeholders,” (Coombs 2010: 
28) which “allows others to control the crisis” (Brummett 1980). Accuracy and consistency 
should be utilized in order to build credibility in the midst of crisis. Coombs claims that 
“inconsistencies create confusion and make crisis managers appear to be incompetent” (Coombs 
2010: 29).  
Other scholars concur and add the following: select and maintain a central spokesperson, 
build relationships and trust with the public, as well as with the media, acknowledge mistakes, 
take public fear and perceptions into consideration, construct and train a crisis handling team 
within the organization, practice simulations of crises, convey the organization’s message in a 
clear, concise way, sincerely show sympathy and concern, keep stakeholders and the public 
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updated on recovery efforts, and analyze management of the crisis and learn from the experience 
(Ashcroft, 1997; Burnett, 1998; Coombs, 1997; Coombs 2010; Covello, 2010: 150; Heath, 2006; 
Maresh and Williams, 2010: 290; Seeger, Sellnow, and Ulmer, 2007; Vigso, 2010).  
Furthermore, Covello adds that relationships with the media, as well as a comprehensive 
risk communication plan should be developed in advance (Covello, 2010: 150). Covello also 
asserts that “a briefing book should be prepared in advance with answers to the most frequently 
asked questions by reporters” and that answers to these questions should be prepared “in 
accordance with the principles of message mapping” (Covello, 2010: 150). In “Best Practices in 
Crisis Communication: Evolution of Practice through Research,” Robert Heath claims that 
exhibiting honesty, candor, and openness, meeting the needs of the media and remaining 
accessible, being committed to serving as the first and best source of information, and delivering 
messages of self-efficacy all constitute what he considers to be best practices for managing and 
communicating during crises (Heath, 2006: 245-248).  
Effective crisis communication also hinges on the communication skills of the leader of 
an organization or an elected spokesperson. According to Covello, successful leaders in the 
midst of crisis “listen to, acknowledge, and respect the fears, anxieties, and uncertainties of the 
many public and key stakeholders; remain calm and in control; take ownership of the issue or 
problem; are visible or readily available; continually look for opportunities to repeat the prepared 
key messages; acknowledge uncertainty; as well as seek, engage, and make extensive use of 
support from credible third parties” (Covello, 2010: 151-152).  
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International Crisis Communication 
Crises are not limited to domestic affairs alone, but rather are often international in scope. 
While the basic theories, strategies, and best practices in crisis communication may be applied to 
international crises, there are other aspects that must be taken into account that are frequently 
overlooked. Falkenheimer and Heide explain that context is often more important than the 
message itself in global crisis communication. However, context varies depending on language 
and culture. This means that in international PR, messages may be skewed or unintentionally 
misunderstood. Falkenheimer and Heide also assert that during crises, ethnic differences seem to 
escalate (Falkenheimer and Heide, 2006). Additionally, Taylor adds that international 
organizations need individuals from host nations to act as “cultural interpreters” in order to 
explain the cultural and societal norms of their home countries. Taylor also claims that it is vital 
for organizations to avoid ethnocentrism in their communication strategies with international 
publics (Taylor, 2000). Understanding that crisis communication should be conducted differently 
depending upon the context and location in which it is enacted is beneficial and relevant to the 
present study as BP is a British owned corporation, yet the oil spill occurred on U.S. territory.  
 
Management of Previous Crises: An Analysis of the Exxon Valdez Case 
In addition to considering effective international crisis communication strategies, it is 
also useful to examine how previous crises have been managed, especially those that are similar 
in nature to the 2010 BP Gulf oil spill. A crisis communication analysis of the Exxon Valdez oil 
spill, which occurred off the coast of Alaska in March 1989 was examined as a comparative 
backdrop for BP’s crisis communication following the 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 
U.S. territory (Anderson, 2002; Eng, 2010; CBS News, 2010; Juhasz, 2010; Kahn, 2010; 
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Mulkern, 2010; Widener and Gunter, 2007). It is apparent that Exxon did not follow the essential 
best practices mentioned above. Johnson and Sellnow (1995) argue that Exxon’s initial response 
was not timely or thoughtful enough. However, Exxon did take a proactive approach, 
discouraging increased government regulation of oil transportation, citing it as unnecessary and 
potentially dangerous. This attempt to protect assets was clearly stated in Exxon’s 
communications. In a speech seven months following the incident, W.D. Stevens, President of 
Exxon Company U.S.A., implied that the event occurred due to “human imperfection” and that 
Exxon was fully capable of cleanup. Related to its stance that government regulation was 
unnecessary, Stevens portrayed Exxon as a victim of government bureaucracy. Stevens’ speech 
was an attempt to salvage Exxon’s image, as well as avoid policy changes restricting oil 
transportation. Furthermore, Johnson and Sellnow assert that “the concept of accountability is 
critical for maintaining a positive public image” (Johnson and Sellnow, 1995: 60). However, it is 
obvious that Exxon did not take full responsibility for the crisis and engaged in unethical crisis 
communication strategies including denial, scapegoating, justification, and evasion of 
responsibility.  
 
Contemporary Application: A Content Analysis of BP’s Response to the 2010 Gulf Oil Spill 
 This thesis seeks to determine, in part, if BP’s crisis management shows any indication of 
“lessons learned” from the Exxon disaster.  Understanding the definition of crisis 
communication, as well as what theories guide effective crisis communication strategies both 
domestically and internationally, is essential to the study of organizational crises. This 
knowledge provides a framework through which BP’s response to the Gulf oil crisis was 
examined. 
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  Specifically, to analyze in what ways contemporary crisis communication practices have 
evolved since the Exxon Valdez incident, a content analysis was conducted of media coverage 
regarding BP’s response to the 2010 Gulf oil spill.  According to the agenda setting theory of the 
press, individuals often form their perceptions or view of a particular topic based on information 
disseminated through the media, as well as how such a topic is represented or framed. This 
theory postulates that the media have a profound impact upon audiences and their beliefs by their 
choice of what stories are considered newsworthy, as well as how much prominence is given to 
them. The manner in which a topic is portrayed in the media and the amount of importance 
bestowed upon it through salience and space, shapes how the public perceives its significance 
and relevance (McCombs, 2005: 156-169). Agenda setting theory of the press applies to the 
content analysis conducted in this study as it examines how BP and its response to the Gulf oil 
spill was represented within the media, in this case newspapers, in regard to prominence (page 
location and article length), salience, and public perception of BP’s reputation and capabilities.  
For this content analysis, three publications, a local Gulf newspaper, the Times-Picayune; 
a U.S. domestic newspaper, the New York Times, and the United Kingdom’s Herald, were 
studied and compared in order to determine differences in their portrayal of BP, BP’s particular 
responses to the 2010 Gulf oil spill crisis, and if such responses were effective and ethical. 
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Research Questions Guiding Content Analysis 
R1:  What was the nature of media coverage, in terms of BP’s oil spill crisis response, as  
         portrayed in the United Kingdom’s Herald, in the New York Times, and in New Orleans,  
         Louisiana’s the Times-Picayune? 
R2:  What types of sources were cited or quoted in articles about the 2010 Gulf oil spill and BP’s  
         crisis response within the United Kingdom’s Herald, in the New York Times, and in New  
         Orleans, Louisiana’s the Times- Picayune? 
R3:  What were the primary topics addressed in articles about the 2010 Gulf oil spill and BP’s  
         crisis response within the United Kingdom’s Herald, in the New York Times, and in New 
         Orleans, Louisiana’s the Times- Picayune?  
R4:  What response strategies did BP engage in during different stages of the crisis? 
R5:  Is there evidence that BP engaged in unethical crisis communication; if yes, what are the  
         most frequently used unethical strategies? 
R6:  Were there significant differences in the BP oil spill coverage as a function of the news  
        source? 
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CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY 
Method 
Content Analysis 
To answer the proposed research questions, a content analysis was performed. A content 
analysis is a systematic, valid, and reliable method used to evaluate specific media content 
(Krippendorf, 2004; Neuendorf, 2002; Weber, 1990). For this study, a content analysis was 
employed using three newspapers to evaluate BP’s response to the 2010 Gulf oil spill, as well as 
to compare disparities in media coverage among the newspapers. Guidelines for performing this 
content analysis were drawn from Krippendorf’s Content Analysis: An Introduction to its 
Methodology (2004). 
 
Sample Inclusion Rules and Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis for this study was newspaper articles found in the United Kingdom’s 
Herald, the New York Times, and New Orleans, Louisiana’s Times-Picayune. Articles for 
analysis that fit the criteria (see article inclusion rules below) that were published over the course 
of four months from April 21, 2010 through September 19, 2010 were selected for analysis. This 
represents the time frame of the BP oil spill crisis. A census sample of articles from all issues 
and sections of the three newspapers during selected time periods of this time frame (see below) 
were included in the study, as they comprised a fair sample of media coverage of the crisis.  
 Because BP is a foreign-owned company, yet the oil spill occurred in U.S. territory, an 
international and two domestic newspapers were examined in this analysis. The medium-sized 
United Kingdom’s Herald was selected as BP is a British owned corporation, anchored in the 
United Kingdom. Although the crisis itself took place within the United States, BP’s global stock 
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and profits, as well as corporate executives and employees were affected. An international 
perspective of the crisis was sought to include an external source with vested interest that was 
affected by the crisis.  
 The New York Times was selected for this study as it is the third largest circulated 
newspaper and the largest paid subscriber newspaper in the United States. For this study, it was 
important to examine a large domestic national newspaper in order to compare media coverage 
with the small local Gulf newspaper, the Times-Picayune. A broader, yet still domestic 
perspective was sought for comparison, especially in regard to prominence and salience given to 
the 2010 Gulf oil crisis and BP’s response. 
 New Orleans, Louisiana’s Times-Picayune was selected for analysis as it represents a 
newspaper from a region directly affected by the oil spill. Oil reached the shores of Louisiana 
and the New Orleans region as early as the end of April. This newspaper was chosen as it is 
located within an affected region of the Gulf, yet has medium-sized circulation, and therefore, 
has the potential to shape widespread perceptions of the public within the Gulf area. A local 
perspective was sought in order to capture how citizens of the Gulf region, Gulf businesses, 
tourism to the Gulf, as well as the environment and overall economy of the Gulf were impacted 
by the oil spill and BP’s response.  
 Articles examined in this content analysis were selected from the time that BP announced 
that an explosion had occurred on its Transocean Deepwater Horizon rig and that oil had begun 
to leak from its well on April 20 through the official statement that the well had been sealed on 
September 19, five months later. Unlike other environmental crises which often can be limited to 
a specific action or event, the crisis examined in this study was continuous over the course of 
several months. Due to the large amount of media coverage that this crisis was given throughout 
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the five-month period, articles included in this study were chosen from dates considered “spikes” 
in media coverage.   Articles for this study were obtained from the online database LexisNexis 
using the search phrase “BP and oil spill.”  
A spike in media coverage was determined by examining the BP oil spill timeline of 
events (Guardian.co.uk) and by observing an increase in the number of articles written, as 
revealed in the newspaper database LexisNexis. For the purposes of this study, a “spike” was 
considered a positive correlation between a cluster of events and an increase in media coverage 
of these events. A spike included a time frame in which several events occurred simultaneously, 
such as President Obama visiting the Gulf, former BP CEO Tony Hayward being replaced, and 
the successful implementation of a valve to stop oil flow. A cluster, such as the one described, 
generated an increase in media coverage, and therefore, can be considered a “spike.” Articles 
included in this content analysis that represented major media spikes are from the following six 
time periods: April 20 to May 5, May 26-30, June 18-26, July 21-29, August 21-28, and 
September 18-23. Within each of these spikes, no single act or comment was the sole reason for 
an increase in media coverage, but rather several clusters of events or incidents triggered media 
coverage. For example, during the spike from July 21-29, BP admitted to using Photoshop to 
exaggerate the level of activity at the Gulf oil spill command center, Tropical Storm Bonnie 
halted oil clean-up in the Gulf, Deepwater Horizon alarms were revealed to have been switched 
off at the time of the explosion to allow workers to sleep, and it was announced that BP Chief 
Executive Tony Hayward would be stepping down from his leadership position. All of these 
events culminated to lead to an increase in media coverage, which is considered a “spike” in this 
study. Other dates selected as spikes were similar in nature to this example. 
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In order to obtain the final sample, relevance was determined, with all irrelevant or 
repeated articles excluded. Irrelevant articles included those from wire services, briefs with short 
synopses of various aspects related to the oil spill and BP’s response, repeated articles, as well as 
those with content that was not related to the study and guiding research questions. For example, 
the BP oil spill might have been mentioned in an article regarding Tropical Storm Bonnie. While 
BP was mentioned once, the article focused on preparation for the storm. The final sample for 
this content analysis was comprised of 164 articles.  
 
Coding Instrument and Definitions of Variables 
In order to answer the research questions and conduct this study, a coding instrument was 
developed and refined by the researcher. The instrument was developed by reading sample 
articles pertaining to this particular oil spill, as well as previously occurring ones, in different 
newspapers than those used in this study. This procedure was followed in order to determine 
primary topics, sources, and other categories reflected in crisis literature that would relate to the 
2010 BP oil spill. The instrument was tested on approximately four articles not included in the 
final study by the principal researcher and the researcher’s advisor to establish initial internal 
reliability of the instrument and to determine whether to add or exclude variables based on their 
relevance (exhaustive categories). Discussion and revisions were made after the coding of each 
article until the coding instrument appeared to be valid and reliable and to reflect the range of 
content that would be assessed.  
 Logistical information was first coded for each article including the origin of each article 
(what newspaper it appeared in; the Times-Picayune = 1, the New York Times = 2, the Herald = 
3), as well as the year (2010), month (1-12), and date (1-31) the article was published.  
Communicating During Crisis   32 
 
Prominence given to the article was measured by several variables. Such variables 
included the section of the newspaper that the article was published, the page number that the 
article was found on, and the word count of the article. These variables were included to measure 
the amount of importance given to each article, as well as the perceived significance that the 
public may draw from the length and location of the article. Because of the limitations with using 
archived articles from LexisNexis, other elements indicating prominence, such as article location 
on page (above or below the newspaper fold), presence of photograph or graphic, or size of 
headline, could not be assessed. Agenda setting theory purports that articles with greater word 
count or those that are placed in the front (or news) section of the newspaper are perceived to 
possess newsworthy qualities, and therefore, are regarded as more important by the public.  
 Crisis stage was also coded in this study. Stages (1-6) correlated with the “spike” in 
which the article was located. Stages included the following: April 20 to May 5 (stage 1), May 
26-30 (stage 2), June 18-26 (stage 3), July 21-29 (stage 4), August 21-28 (stage 5), and 
September 18-23 (stage 6). 
 Another variable tested in this content analysis was sources cited or quoted within the 
article. Sources are also integral to prominence as credibility, and in turn, importance is attached 
to certain types of individuals, such as the President of the U.S. or BP executives. Categories for 
this variable included: BP company spokesperson, BP company official/executive, BP employee, 
U.S. government official or agency, U.S. President, U.K government official or agency, U.K. 
Prime Minister, Local (Gulf) official, engineer, environmental scientist, environmental activist, 
economist, citizen of the Gulf region, industrial or trade organization, Gulf business 
leader/owner/manager, tourist of the Gulf, health expert, veterinarian/animal scientist, 
emergency response worker, coast guard, and other. Refer to Appendix B for definitions of these 
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categories. It is also important to note that categories within this variable were not mutually 
exclusive. For example, an oceanographer from the Environmental Protection Agency was coded 
as both an environmental scientist and as a U.S. government agency. This was done so that all 
citations or quotations would be coded; yet expertise in a particular area would be recorded as 
well. If the source was present in an article, it was coded with a 1, if it was not present, it was 
coded with a 2. 
 Additionally, topics addressed within each article were coded. “Topics addressed” was 
created as a variable in order to determine the purpose of each article, as well as the scope of 
information being covered by the newspapers in regard to the 2010 Gulf oil spill and BP’s 
response. Categories for this variable included: impact on land, water, and/or plant life; impact 
on humans and/or animal life; clean-up processes or attempts to stop the spill; government 
comment, government action/policies; human interest; economic impact on Gulf tourism and 
local (Gulf) businesses; economic impact on BP stock and profits; economic impact on other 
national/international businesses or industries; comment made by BP; reported action taken by 
BP regarding management of the spill; criticism of BP’s crisis management response; and other. 
Refer to Appendix B for definitions of these categories. For this variable, an article could contain 
more than one topic or category. If a topic was present in the article, it was coded with a 1. If a 
topic was not present, it was coded with a 2.  
 Using these same categories, another variable, primary article topic, was tested. Primary 
article topic was determined by examining the headline of the article, as well as the first two 
paragraphs of each article. Primary article topic was examined in order to gain an understanding 
of what type of information was covered most in the three newspapers and what topics were 
regarded as most significant for coverage by each of the newspapers and when. Topics 
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addressed, and more specifically the primary topic addressed, in each article also measure 
prominence, as perceived importance is attached by the public to particular topics receiving more 
frequent media coverage. For primary topic addressed, one to two categories could be selected. 
Present primary topics were coded with a 1, while those not present were coded with a 2.  
 Another variable tested in this content analysis was BP’s response/PR strategies 
employed. This is the principal purpose of this study and serves as the basis of the fundamental 
research questions guiding this content analysis. In order to determine if BP responded 
effectively or unethically during the 2010 Gulf oil crisis, response strategies and crisis 
management techniques were measured. This variable included various crisis communication 
strategies, both ethical and unethical (as described in review above), that could have been 
employed by BP and serves to identify which ones BP actually utilized. Based on the response 
and management strategies BP chose to employ, conclusions can be made about how effectively 
BP responded to the crisis. Furthermore, this variable allows for comparison between the three 
newspapers regarding how BP’s crisis management skills are portrayed. Categories for this 
variable included: attack of the accuser, denial, scapegoating, justification, compensation, 
ingratiation, victimage, evasion of responsibility, bolstering, minimization, differentiation, 
transcendence, mortification, apology, timely response, acknowledgement of mistakes, clear and 
concise dissemination of message by a BP spokesperson or official, expressing concern and 
sympathy for impact, updating the public or stakeholders on the situation/recovery efforts, “no 
comment” used by a BP spokesperson or official, and other. Refer to Appendix B for definitions 
of these categories, as well as the “Action and Strategies in Crisis Communication” above. It is 
also important to note that categories within this variable are not mutually exclusive. For 
example, if a BP executive responded to the media with “no comment,” this action would be 
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coded as both “no comment” used by a BP spokesperson or official and as evasion of 
responsibility, as BP was not accountable for its actions or statements and chose to avoid 
offering an answer to a question directly posed by the media. This coding is supported in the 
literature. For this variable, if a particular response strategy was present, it was coded with a 1. If 
a response strategy was not present in the article, it was coded with a 2. 
 Related to the previous variable, the presence of unethical crisis management or 
communication practices was examined. For the purpose of this study, attack of the accuser, 
denial, scapegoating, justification, ingratiation, victimage, evasion of responsibility, bolstering, 
minimization, differentiation, transcendence, mortification, and “no comment” used by a BP 
spokesperson or official were considered unethical practices. Meanwhile, compensation, 
apology, timely response, acknowledgment of mistakes, clear and concise dissemination of 
messages by a BP official or spokesperson, expressing concern and sympathy for impact, and 
updating the public or stakeholders on the situation/recovery efforts were deemed ethical 
practices. If an unethical practice was present, it was coded with a 1. If no unethical practice was 
present in the article, it was coded with a 2. 
 
Coder Selection and Training 
In addition to the primary coder, who coded all 164 articles, a second coder was 
employed to code ten percent of the total sample (17 articles). The second coder’s results were 
then compared to those of the primary coder in order to determine inter-rater reliability. The 
second coder was paid for her work through a Holcomb Undergraduate Grant obtained by the 
primary coder through Butler University.  
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 The second coder, who had no previous experience or knowledge in the field of crisis 
communication or content analyses, was trained by the primary coder to carry out the content 
analysis on the 17 articles using the same coding instrument devised by the primary coder. 
Training for the second coder included orientation to the research study, explanation of content 
analysis, explanation of coding variables and categories by the primary coder, as well as the 
coding of four articles not included in the final sample by the second coder until near perfect 
agreement was reached with the principal coder. This training took approximately two hours. 
The second coder completed coding of the articles twice, as the first time discrepancies between 
the primary and secondary coder were too great to ensure reliability. This was due to a time lag 
from when the second coder was initially trained until when she coded the articles for the first 
time due to academic holidays (five weeks). Upon realization of observable discrepancies by the 
primary coder on the first couple of articles, the second coder was re-trained and completed 
coding of the articles again. 
 The articles chosen for the second coder were randomly selected using a random numbers 
chart, in which all 164 articles were assigned a number and then 17 were randomly selected by 
correlating the articles with the random numbers chart. The second coder was also provided with 
the same coding instrument, including variable and category definitions that the principal 
researcher used. 
 To test inter-rater reliability, Cohen’s Kappa coefficient statistic was employed. This 
statistic measures agreement while also accounting for coded agreement that would occur by 
chance.  
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CHAPTER THREE: RESULTS 
 
Results 
  
For this content analysis, primarily descriptive statistics were applied to analyze the data, 
using the statistical program SPSS for Windows. 
 
General Results on Media Coverage 
 In the final sample, 53 percent (87) of the 164 articles were from New Orleans’ Times-
Picayune, 32.9 percent (54) of the articles were from the New York Times, and 14 percent (23) 
were from the United Kingdom’s Herald. All articles were from late April to mid September 
2010. 38 articles (23.2 percent) studied were from May, 26.8 percent (44) were from July, and 
26.8 percent (37) were from August. One hundred seven of the 164 articles (65.2 percent) were 
published in the front (news) section of the newspaper, with 30.5 percent (50) of all articles 
located on the front page. The average length of articles examined in this study was 833.7 words, 
with a minimum of 64 words and a maximum of 5401 words (SD=525.69). See Appendix C for 
all frequencies.  
 
Sources Cited or Quoted 
 Frequencies of specific sources cited or quoted in the articles varied, with some present in 
over 50 percent of the articles and others not present at all (emergency response workers and 
veterinarians/animal scientists). BP executives were cited or quoted most frequently of all 
sources, appearing in 53.7 percent (88) of the articles. Of these 88 articles, 38 were found in the 
Times-Picayune (43.2 percent), 34 in the New York Times (38.6 percent), and 16 (18.2 percent) 
in the Herald. Of only 23 total articles from the Herald, 69.6 percent (16) cited or quoted BP 
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executives, such as former CEO Tony Hayward, new CEO Bob Dudley, and Executive Vice 
President Lamar McKay. Other sources connected to BP were less frequently represented in the 
articles, with only 11 percent (18) of articles citing or quoting a BP spokesperson and only 9.8 
percent (16) of articles including a BP employee.  
 Government officials were cited or quoted frequently within the articles. In 61.6 percent 
(101) of the articles, a U.S. government official or agency was cited or quoted, ranging from the 
Senator of Arkansas to the Environmental Protection Agency. Forty-nine of these 101 articles 
(48.5 percent) with a U.S. government official or agency as a source were found in the Times-
Picayune, while 41 were located in the New York Times (40.6 percent). 24.4 percent (40) of all 
the articles cited or quoted the U.S. President as a source, with over half (21 of 40; 52.5 percent) 
found in the Times-Picayune. Local Gulf officials, such as Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal, 
were cited or quoted in 31.7 percent (52) of the 164 articles analyzed. Forty-three of these 52 
articles (82.7 percent) citing or quoting a local Gulf official as a source were found in the Times-
Picayune. National or international industrial or trade organizations, especially those connected 
with the fishing and oil industries, were cited or quoted in 24.4 percent (40) of all the articles, 
while 27.4 percent (45) of articles included the coast guard as a source. See Table 1 below for 
frequencies. 
 
Table 1: Sources Cited or Quoted Within Articles 
 
Source: Source Cited or Quoted in Article: 
BP spokesperson 18 (11 %) 
BP official or executive 88 (53.7 %) 
BP employee 16 (9.8 %) 
U.S. government official or agency 101 (61.6 %) 
U.S. President 40 (24.4 %) 
U.K government official or agency 1 (0.6 %) 
U.K Prime Minister 3 (1.8 %) 
Local (Gulf) official 52 (31.7 %) 
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Engineer 5 (3 %) 
Environmental scientist 26 (15.9 %) 
Environmental activist 12 (7.3 %) 
Economist 5 (3 %) 
Citizen of Gulf region 9 (5.5 %) 
Industrial/trade organization 40 (24.4 %) 
Gulf business leader, owner/manager 17 (10.4 %) 
Tourist of Gulf 2 (1.2 %) 
Health expert 3 (1.8 %) 
Coast guard 45 (27.4 %) 
Other 46 (28 %) 
 
*** Note: Any variables not listed occurred zero times in the 164 articles  
 
 
Topics Addressed 
 Reported action taken by BP was the topic addressed most frequently in articles 
examined, occurring in 55.5 percent (91) of the articles. Clean-up of the oil spill was the second 
most frequently addressed topic and was present in 51.8 percent (85) of the 164 articles, with a 
great deal of emphasis placed on the development and implementation of new technology for 
leaking oil valves. Comments made by both BP and the government were present in just under 
half of the articles, with comments made by BP found in 47 percent (77) of articles and 
comments made by the government in 43.3 percent (71) of articles. These comments ranged 
from formal announcements to the nation or Gulf residents to quotes of government officials to 
the press. Sixty-eight articles (41.5 percent) addressed topics not included in the coding 
instrument, such as legal trials, a moratorium placed on Gulf fishers, and volunteer opportunities 
for clean-up. Meanwhile, criticism of BP’s crisis management efforts was present in 35.4 percent 
(58) of the articles analyzed and was found coming from a variety of sources, from government 
officials and agencies to residents of the Gulf. 
The most frequently addressed topics, including reported action taken by BP, comment 
made by BP, and comment made by government, were present in articles in each of the three 
Communicating During Crisis   40 
 
newspapers relatively evenly. Clean-up of the oil spill, however, was addressed in the Times-
Picayune more often than the other newspapers with almost half (41 of the 85) of the articles 
with this topic present found in the Gulf newspaper. See Table 2 below for frequencies. 
 
Table 2: Topics Addressed in Articles 
 
Topic Addressed in Article: Number of Articles Topic Addressed In: 
Impact on land, water, and/or plant life 47 (28.7 %) 
Impact on humans and/or animal life 56 (34.1 %) 
Clean-up processes or attempts to stop the spill 85 (51.8 %) 
Government comment 71 (43.3 %) 
Government action/policies 49 (29.9 %) 
Economic impact on Gulf tourism and local 
(Gulf) businesses 
44 (26.8 %) 
Economic impact on BP stock and profits 28 (17.1 %) 
Economic impact on other national/international 
businesses or industries 
41 (25 %) 
Comment made by BP 77 (47 %) 
Reported action taken by BP regarding 
management of the spill 
91 (55.5 %) 
Criticism of BP’s crisis management response 58 (35.4 %) 
Other 68 (41.5 %) 
 
*** Note: Any variables not listed occurred zero times in the 164 articles  
 
Primary Topics Addressed 
 Despite being the second most frequently addressed topic in the articles in terms of all 
possible topics that were mentioned in articles, clean-up of the oil spill served as the most 
frequently addressed primary topic, those highlighted in the headline and/or first two paragraphs, 
with 31.7 percent (52) of articles focusing on this topic. For example, efforts to seal valves, both 
with new technologically advanced fixtures and with mud, as well as efforts to clean beaches 
covered in oil slicks were recurring themes under this primary topic. Reported action taken by 
BP, such as compensation paid to individuals impacted by the spill or conferences with local 
Gulf officials, accounted as the primary topic addressed in 23.2 percent (38) of the articles. 
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Furthermore, criticism of BP’s crisis management efforts was addressed as the primary topic in 
20.1 percent (33) of the articles. Topics not included in the coding instrument accounted for the 
primary topic in 26.8 percent (44) of the 164 articles. Some examples of primary topics coded in 
the “other” category that accounted for this large percentage included legal trials involving BP or 
weather related halting of clean-up.  
 Environmental and ecological impact of the oil spill, although likely assumed to be core 
concerns or focus areas of attention during such crises, did not occur frequently as primary topics 
addressed in this study. Only 9.1 percent (15) of the articles included impact on land, water, 
and/or plant life as a primary topic, while only 11 percent (18) of the articles focused on impact 
on humans and/or animal life as a primary topic. The articles in which these two categories 
served as the primary topic were disproportionately found in the Times-Picayune. Ten of the 15 
articles (66.7 percent) that addressed impact on land, water, and/or plant life as a primary topic, 
such as oil beads found on beaches, were found in the Times-Picayune; 11 of the 18 (61.1 
percent) that addressed impact on humans and/or animal life, including oil-covered seagulls and 
injured Deepwater Horizon rig workers, were found in the Times-Picayune as well. Furthermore, 
government action/policy, economic on Gulf tourism and local (Gulf) businesses, and economic 
impact on other national/international businesses or industries served as primary topics most 
frequently in the Times-Picayune. Contrarily, economic impact on BP stock and profits was 
addressed as the primary topic in the Herald disproportionately, with a great deal of attention 
given to declining stock values for the company.  Six of the 13 articles (46.2 percent) that 
included this category as the primary topic were from the U.K. newspaper. See Table 3 below for 
frequencies. 
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Table 3: Primary Topics Addressed in Articles 
 
Primary Topic Addressed in Article: Number of Articles Primary Topic 
Addressed In: 
Impact on land, water, and/or plant life 15 (9.1 %) 
Impact on humans and/or animal life 18 (11 %) 
Clean-up processes or attempts to stop the 
spill 
52 (31.7 %) 
Government comment 13 (7.9 %) 
Government action/policies 21 (12.8 %) 
Economic impact on Gulf tourism and local 
(Gulf) businesses 
19 (11.6 %) 
Economic impact on BP stock and profits 13 (7.9 %) 
Economic impact on other 
national/international businesses or industries 
15 (9.1 %) 
Comment made by BP 3 (1.8 %) 
Reported action taken by BP regarding 
management of the spill 
38 (23.2 %) 
Criticism of BP’s crisis management response 33 (20.1 %) 
Other 44 (26.8 %) 
 
*** Note: Any variables not listed occurred zero times in the 164 articles  
 
BP’s Response/PR Strategies Employed 
 Results pertaining to BP’s response and crisis management strategies reveal that BP 
employed effective and ethical crisis communication practices more often than unethical 
strategies. In 43.3 percent (77) of the articles, BP updated the public or stakeholders on the 
situation/recovery efforts, as well as displayed clear, concise dissemination of a message by a BP 
spokesperson or official in 28.7 percent (47) of the articles. Compensation was the third most 
frequently occurring PR and crisis management strategy employed by BP and was present in 
23.2 percent (38) of the articles. Compensation was primarily reported as restitution being paid 
to Gulf businesses ensuing financial losses, rig workers injured during the explosion on the 
Deepwater Horizon rig, and to the State of Louisiana.  
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Crisis management strategies considered unethical were less apparent in the articles, with 
evasion of responsibility by BP found in 16.5 percent (27) of the articles. Examples of evasion of 
responsibility found in the sample of articles included the refusal of BP to comment on photos 
falsely doctored on Photoshop of their work station, as well as when former CEO Tony Hayward 
took a vacation in the midst of the crisis. Denial and scapegoating were the other most frequently 
unethical practices employed by BP, yet were found in a low percentage of articles. Denial, 
including BP’s outright decree that they could do nothing to stop increased flows of oil from 
leaking valves, was apparent in 5.5 percent (9) of the articles, while scapegoating was present in 
4.9 percent (8) of the articles. An example of scapegoating found in the articles included when 
BP placed the blame of the Deepwater Horizon explosion on Transocean instead of taking 
responsibility itself.  Furthermore, BP only acknowledged their mistakes in 3.7 percent of the 
articles (6) and offered a clear apology in only 2 articles (1.2 percent). Overall, unethical 
responses or crisis management strategies were employed by BP in 17.7 percent (29) of the 164 
articles, with BP employing tactics and practices deemed effective and ethical in 82.3 percent 
(135) of the articles. See Table 4 below for frequencies. 
 
Table 4: BP’s Response to the Crisis 
 
BP’s response/PR 
strategies employed: 
Times-Picayune New York 
Times 
Herald Total: 
Attack of accuser 0 1 0 1 (0.6 %) 
Denial 3 5 1 9 (5.5 %) 
Scapegoating 1 5 2 8 (4.9 %) 
Compensation 24 9 5 38 (23.2 %) 
Evasion of responsibility 7 14 6 27 (16.5 %) 
Minimization 1 2 0 3 (1.8 %) 
Mortification 0 1 0 1 (0.6 %) 
Apology 1 0 1 2 (1.2 %) 
Timely response 7 7 1 15 (9.1 %) 
Acknowledgment of 
mistakes 
4 2 0 6 (3.7 %) 
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Clear, concise 
dissemination of message 
by BP 
21 20 6 47 (28.7 %) 
Expressing sympathy and 
concern for impact 
1 0 1 2 (1.2 %) 
Updating the public or 
stakeholders of the 
situation/recovery efforts 
31 29 11 71 (43.3 %) 
“No comment” by BP 4 2 2 8 (4.9 %) 
Other 1 1 0 2 (1.2 %) 
 
*** Note: Any variables not listed occurred zero times in the 164 articles  
 
 
Differences in Crisis Response Strategies 
 BP’s crisis management responses, as well as media coverage of these responses, differed 
throughout the five month oil spill crisis. Examination of each of the “stages” of the crisis 
revealed discrepancies regarding unethical and ethical crisis responses. Of the 29 articles that 
included unethical responses, 11 (37.9 percent) were found in the first stage of the crisis, April 
20-May 5. This stage is important to examine as it was the two weeks following the origin of the 
crisis. Immediate response strategies employed during a crisis are crucial to the reputation of 
organization involved as public perception is highly malleable during this time. Of the 45 total 
articles that comprised the sample from Stage 1, 4 included denial (8.9 percent), 3 included 
scapegoating (6.7 percent), 9 included evasion of responsibility (20 percent), 1 included 
minimization (2.2 percent), and 2 included “no comment” by a BP official or spokesperson (4.4 
percent). More than one of these unethical response strategies were found in some articles, which 
explains why a total of 19 unethical response strategies were found, yet were included in only 11 
articles. For example, sub-categories under the “BP crisis management response” variable were 
not mutually exclusive, meaning that scapegoating and evasion of responsibility could be coded 
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for the same article as blaming others in turn is not assuming responsibility for actions or 
comments. 
The only other stage that showed a significant amount of unethical responses was Stage 4 
(July 21-29), which included 7 of the 29 unethical responses (24.1 percent) reported in the 164 
total articles. While frequency differences were apparent, Pearson Chi-Square results did not 
detect significant differences in unethical responses as a function of crisis stage, because sample 
size of articles within some stages was limited, with fewer than five articles found in a cell. In 
order to conduct a Chi Square statistic, more than five cases in each cell must be examined. See 
Table 5 below for frequencies. 
 
Table 5: Presence of Unethical Crisis Response Strategies by Stages 
 
Stage of Crisis:  Number of Articles Unethical 
Crisis Response Present In: 
Stage 1 (April 20-May 5) 11 
Stage 2 (May 26-May 30) 3 
Stage 3 (June 18-June 26) 2 
Stage 4 (July 21-July 29) 7 
Stage 5 (August 21-August 28) 4 
Stage 6 (September 18-September 23) 2 
 
 
However, a significant difference was found in overall unethical responses among all 164 
articles. As reported above, articles including unethical crisis management responses employed 
by BP were found disproportionately in the New York Times (14 articles from this newspaper out 
of 29 articles containing unethical responses from all three newspapers—48.3 percent), as well 
as disproportionately within the Herald itself (7 articles included unethical responses out of a 
sample size of 23 articles for this newspaper—30.4 percent). These differences are significant, as 
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tested by the Pearson Chi-Square statistic: 2 = 9.39 (df = 2, p<.01). See Table 6 below for 
frequencies. 
 
Table 6: Presence of Unethical Crisis Response Strategies by Source 
 
 Times Picayune New York Times Herald Total: 
Unethical PR 
Crisis Response 
Employed by BP 
8 14 7 29 
 
 
Significant differences were also found in specific unethical response strategies. Evasion 
of responsibility was found in 27 of the 164 articles (16.5 percent). Of the 27 articles that 
included evasion of responsibility, 14 (51.9 percent) were found in the New York Times, which is 
a much greater amount than the other two newspapers (2 = 9.55, df = 2, p < .01).  
Additionally, scapegoating was another unethical response strategy approaching 
significant difference (2 = 5.56. df = 2, p < .07). Of the 8 articles (out of 164 total—4.9 percent) 
that included scapegoating, 5 were found in the New York Times (62.5 percent). See Table 7 
below for results. 
 
Table 7: Chi Square Results-Significant Difference in BP’s Crisis Management Responses 
 
Crisis Management 
Response Employed by 
BP: 
Χ2 df  p value 
Scapegoating 5.56 2 .06 
Evasion of responsibility 9.55 2 .01** 
Unethical response 
employed 
9.40 2 .01** 
 
*p < .05 
** p < .01  
*** p < .001 
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CHAPTER FOUR: DISCUSSION 
 
Discussion 
 
This thesis study set out to determine crisis communication practices employed by an 
international company whose crisis occurred in U.S. territory. For this study the 2010 BP oil spill 
in the Gulf of Mexico off the Southeastern coast of the United States serves as contemporary 
example of an organization facing a crisis, as well as provides a forum for investigating and 
analyzing crisis communication in action. While this particular crisis can be deemed an 
environmental crisis by nature, it is unique in regard to its length and scope. Most crises are one-
time incidences that are short-lived; however, the 2010 BP Gulf oil spill was an ongoing crisis 
spanning across a five-month period. This is important to recognize as crisis communication 
responses had to remain continuous, as well as did efforts to maintain favorable public 
perception. It is also important to understand the scope of the BP oil spill as it had an 
international component. Even though the crisis itself took place on U.S. territory, BP is a 
British-owned company. While a majority of the primary action taken to mitigate the impact of 
the crisis was done within the U.S., crisis communication practices had to be executed both 
domestically and internationally. The reputation of BP as a company had to be protected within 
the United States, as well as within the United Kingdom. Therefore, this study focused not only 
on two U.S. newspapers (the New York Times and the Times-Picayune), but also a U.K. national 
newspaper (the Herald).  
 
Nature of Media Coverage 
Prominence given to media coverage of a crisis plays an important role in the public’s 
perception of the organization involved, as well as its management of the crisis. Regarding 
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research question one related to media coverage of the 2010 BP Gulf oil crisis, a great deal of 
prominence was given to the crisis throughout the five-month period in which it occurred from 
April 20 through September 19. This was expected as changes in oil flow, efforts to stop leaking 
oil valves, as well as responses/actions occurred within the government and BP management. In 
the study it was found that each month the crisis and BP’s response received media coverage, 
with the largest number of articles published in  May (23.2 percent/38 articles), July (26.8 
percent/44 articles), and August (26.8 percent/ 37 articles).  
Furthermore, media coverage within stages of the crisis was parallel to the frequency of 
media coverage by month. Forty-five articles (27.4 percent) were from the first stage of the crisis 
(April 20-May 5), while 44 articles (26.8 percent) represented Stage 4 (July 21-29). Because 
communication with the public on behalf of an organization is crucial immediately following a 
crisis, it is not surprising that the Stage 1 received the most media coverage. It is also of no 
surprise that Stage 4 (July 21-29) received the second most coverage as a cluster of explosive 
events took place, including BP admitting to falsely using Photoshop in order to exaggerate 
activity in their oil spill command center, Tropical Storm Bonnie putting a halt on oil spill clean-
up and sealing efforts, the discovery that alarms were shut off on the Deepwater Horizon oil rig 
that exploded to allow workers to sleep, and the announcement that former CEO Tony Hayward 
was planning to step down from his leadership position. These were all significant events that 
portrayed BP in a negative way, and therefore, were newsworthy for media coverage. This 
research shows that despite the ongoing nature of this crisis, media coverage was continuous 
throughout, revealing that the topic of BP and the oil spill was regarded as important by the 
newspapers, and thus  likely also to be viewed as important by the public, not only for the initial 
month of the crisis but for its entirety.  
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Not only was the BP oil spill news coverage high in terms of total article count, but also 
the news was often prominently displayed.  The majority of articles, 107 of the 164 articles (65.2 
percent), were published in the front (news) section of the newspaper, with 30.5 percent (50) of 
all articles located on the front page. Location of the article is an important descriptor of 
prominence; therefore, it can be said that the 2010 BP Gulf oil spill was considered newsworthy 
and was given significant prominence as front page news in a large percentage of the cases 
studied in the content analysis. This was expected, especially within the Times-Picayune, as 
articles possessed news values of proximity (except for the Herald), human interest, impact, 
timeliness, and unusualness due to its nature as a crisis. 
 
Sources Cited or Quoted Within Articles 
Not surprisingly, individuals connected to BP were also featured in a high percentage of 
the articles examined, revealing that the organization was taking action to manage the crisis, as 
well as openly communicate with the public, which is an integral component of effective crisis 
communication. Regarding research question two, BP executives were cited or quoted most 
frequently of all sources, appearing in 53.7 percent (88) of the articles. Of these 88 articles, 38 
were found in the Times-Picayune (43.2 percent), which was the highest percentage of the three 
newspapers. This was expected as this newspaper is based in the Gulf, takes on a local 
perspective, and is obligated to providing Gulf residents with reports of action being taken to 
directly remedy their situations. Meanwhile, of only 23 total articles from the Herald, 69.6 
percent (16) cited or quoted BP executives.  This significant difference may be explained due to 
the more business-oriented interests of the U.K. newspaper as it serves as the international 
headquarters of BP. Articles from the Herald tended to be more formally written and detached 
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from the crisis’s impact on the Gulf. Reporting in this newspaper was indifferent, focusing on 
BP’s action and stock from BP’s perspective; hence, it is not shocking that BP executives are 
disproportionately cited or quoted.  
 Because the crisis occurred within U.S. territory and had farther reaching impact than the 
Gulf alone, U.S. government officials were cited or quoted frequently within the articles as well. 
In 61.6 percent (101) of the articles, U.S. government officials or agencies, often the Minerals 
Management Service and members of Congress, were cited or quoted, while 24.4 percent (40) of 
all the articles cited or quoted the U.S. President as a source. This reveals prominence given to 
the crisis, as it was considered important enough for influential sources to be cited or quoted 
within articles regarding the topic and BP’s response. Most U.S. government officials were cited 
or quoted regarding comments of reassurance to Gulf residents, related to clean-up and impact of 
the spill, or to criticism of BP’s response and management of the crisis. Public opinion is highly 
swayed by the government’s stance on an issue; therefore, it was not surprising that the 
government was chosen as a source by news reporters when covering this crisis 
It is also important to note that local Gulf officials were cited or quoted in 31.7 percent 
(52) of the 164 articles analyzed. Forty-three of these 52 articles (82.7 percent) citing or quoting 
Gulf officials as a source were found in the Times-Picayune. This was expected as this 
newspaper is based in the Gulf where direct impact from the crisis was felt. The close proximity 
to the site of the crisis explains the more locally focused nature of media coverage in this 
particular newspaper.  
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Topics Addressed in Media Coverage 
Regarding research question three, topics addressed in media coverage of the 2010 BP oil 
spill crisis in this study, the four most frequently addressed article topics included reported action 
taken by BP (55.5 percent/ 91 articles), clean-up (51.8 percent/ 85 articles), comments made by 
BP (47 percent/ 77 articles), and comments made by the U.S. government (43.3 percent/ 71 
articles). This reveals that topics considered most important by newspaper editors, and therefore, 
those receiving more media coverage, were related to BP’s response, both action and comments, 
to the crisis, as well as the U.S. government’s opinion on BP’s efforts. This is not surprising as 
the public desires for quick and successful action to be taken, as well as to be well-informed of 
recovery efforts from those involved.  
 
Primary Topics Addressed Within Articles 
Additionally, clean-up of the oil spill was the most frequently addressed primary topic 
appearing in 31.7 percent (52) of the 164 articles examined in this study, while reported action 
taken by BP was the second most frequently addressed primary topic, appearing in 23.2 percent 
(38) of the articles. It is also important to note that criticism of BP’s crisis management was the 
third most frequently occurring primary topic addressed in the articles (20.1 percent/ 33 articles). 
Because primary topics were defined as topics highlighted in the headline and/or first two 
paragraphs of an article, the most frequently occurring primary topics differ from the most 
frequent topics addressed in general. The primary topics addressed most often emphasize the 
significance placed upon action taken by BP to manage the crisis on an environmental and 
ecological level, as well as on a public relations level. This is not surprising as the public desires 
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continuous communication by the organization involved as an effective crisis response strategy, 
as well as proof that responsibility and action are being assumed. 
It was shocking to find that environmental and ecological impact of the oil spill, although 
likely to be an area of primary concern for the U.S., and more specifically, the Gulf, did not 
occur frequently as primary topics addressed in this study. Only 9.1 percent (15) of the articles 
included impact on land, water, and/or plant life as a primary topic, while only 11 percent (18) of 
the articles focused on impact on humans and/or animal life as a primary topic. Of the few 
articles in which these two categories served as the primary topic, a disproportionate number was 
found in the Times-Picayune as expected. Ten of the 15 articles (66.7 percent) that addressed 
impact on land, water, and/or plant life as a primary topic were found in the Times-Picayune; 11 
of the 18 (61.1 percent) that addressed impact on humans and/or animal life were found in the 
Times-Picayune as well. This was not a shocking finding, as environmental and ecological 
impact was much greater on the Gulf region due to the location of the crisis and the high priority 
of Gulf residents to restore the environment to the way it was prior to the crisis. 
Furthermore, government action/policy, economic impact on Gulf tourism and local 
(Gulf) businesses, and economic impact on other national/international businesses or industries 
were disproportionately represented in the Times-Picayune. These results were not surprising as 
travel and tourism to the Gulf were severely limited due to the environmental and ecological 
damage caused by the crisis. Due to the unattractive nature of the Gulf as a tourist destination, 
the economy of the Gulf, including Gulf businesses, was impacted greatly as the crisis occurred 
throughout months considered vacation time for most individuals and families. Other national 
and international businesses, especially the fishing industry, were negatively impacted as well 
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due to the crisis as oil affected the quality of fish caught, the ability to fish in general, and the 
public’s likelihood to purchase fish from the Gulf region. 
 On a wider scale, economic impact on BP stock and profits was disproportionately 
addressed as the primary topic in the Herald, with a great deal of attention given to declining 
stock values for the company.  Six of the 13 articles (46.2 percent) that included this category as 
the primary topic were from the U.K. newspaper. This is not surprising as coverage of the crisis 
in the Herald assumed a more formal nature and tended to focus more on business aspects. As 
the headquarters for BP, the United Kingdom had more vested interest in the economic success 
or failure of the company than the environmental, ecological, and tourism impact experienced in 
Gulf. 
 
BP’s Response and Crisis Management Strategies Employed During the Crisis 
Related to research question four regarding BP’s efforts to respond to the crisis, results 
revealed that BP employed both ethical and unethical crisis management strategies, yet more 
often than not, the strategies executed by BP were ethical and demonstrated effective crisis 
communication. Of the 164 articles included in the final sample, 82.3 percent (135) contained 
effective and ethical crisis management responses employed by BP. Of these ethical practices, 
BP updated the public or stakeholders on the situation/recovery efforts in 43.3 percent (77) of the 
articles, as well as displayed clear, concise dissemination of a message by a BP spokesperson or 
official in 28.7 percent (47) of the articles. These two response strategies denote responsibility 
and concern/sympathy for the impact caused by the crisis. These responses are also considered 
effective crisis management according to scholarly research as they serve to notify, develop, and 
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maintain positive public perception of the organization, its actions, and its reputation during the 
time of a crisis.  
Furthermore, BP also frequently employed compensation as a PR and crisis management 
strategy. Compensation, especially to victims of the Deepwater Horizon rig explosion and to 
Gulf businesses economically impacted by the crisis, was found in 23.2 percent (38) of the 
articles. This reveals that BP acknowledged the impact that the crisis directly had upon 
individuals and businesses, as well as expressed willingness to take action to repay or repair 
damage caused to such individuals and organizations. It was expected that BP would compensate 
individuals personally injured or those businesses sustaining detrimental losses as compensation 
is an ethical act displaying responsibility in a crisis situation in which an organization is 
involved. However, the overall high percentage of ethical response strategies employed by BP 
was shocking as it is a more natural response for organizations or individuals under pressure and 
blame to react unethically and without consideration. 
 
Unethical Crisis Response Strategies Employed by BP 
While only a small percentage of the 164 articles examined for this study were found to 
contain unethical crisis management strategies (17.7 percent/ 29 articles), it is still important to 
note that during the course of the crisis, BP did engage in some degree of behavior that is 
considered unethical.  Regarding research question five, evasion of responsibility (16.5 
percent/27 articles), denial (5.5 percent/9 articles), and scapegoating (4.9 percent/8 articles) were 
the most frequently occurring unethical practices reportedly employed by BP. This type of 
behavior was not surprising as the unexpected nature of a crisis can catch an organization off 
guard and unprepared. In times of panic or pressure, it is often easier for organizational leaders to 
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ignore their responsibility to respond to the crisis, as well as their accountability to the public. 
Placing blame on others, denying that an event occurred as a result of the organization or that it 
even took place at all, and employing other responses that evade responsibility, represent simpler 
and less risky strategies for a company to follow.  
Furthermore, unethical crisis management strategies were found disproportionately in the 
New York Times in comparison to the other two newspapers, answering research question six 
regarding differences in media coverage as a function of the news source in which articles were 
found. Of the 29 articles that included unethical responses, 14 were from the New York Times 
(48.3 percent). This significant difference was not surprising as this publication often assumes a 
critical watchdog role for the nation. Also, as a domestic newspaper, the New York Times has 
vested interest in the crisis as it occurred in U.S. territory, yet it does not have as much interest in 
Gulf residents and businesses as the Times-Picayune. Therefore, the New York Times assumes a 
more objective and detached view of the crisis in its reporting, allowing for a more critical 
stance.  
It is also important to note that unethical responses were found disproportionately within 
the small sample of Herald articles as well, with 7 articles including unethical responses out of a 
sample size of only 23 articles for this newspaper—30.4 percent. While the high percentage of 
unethical responses found in the New York Times can be explained by its watchdog role, the high 
proportion of unethical responses of BP in the Herald may be attributed to its more external 
position to the crisis, as well as its more detached viewpoint toward residents and businesses in 
the Gulf itself. This significant difference was unexpected, yet due to its distance from the 
location of the crisis and its indifference toward the environmental, ecological, and economic 
impact specifically on the Gulf, it can be understood.  
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Also answering research question four, the particular stage of the crisis played a 
significant role regarding when unethical crisis responses occurred. Of the 29 articles that 
included unethical crisis management responses, 11 (37.9 percent) were found in the first two 
weeks after the crisis erupted (stage 1: April 20-May 5). As explained earlier, during a crisis, 
immediate response is essential to the reputation of the organization involved as public 
perception is much more likely to be influenced during this time. Therefore, it is significant to 
note that within this crucial first stage of the 2010 BP Gulf oil spill crisis, a large degree of media 
coverage regarding BP’s crisis management response was unethical in nature. This came as no 
surprise as initial responses to unexpected crises are often ones that evade responsibility, 
especially when organizations involved are not fully prepared to manage them. This cluster of 
unethical crisis management strategies employed by BP during stage one of the crisis portrayed 
the organization negatively, highlighting its unpreparedness, lack of professionalism, and scant 
organizational skills. This unethical behavior on behalf of BP, as well as the negative media 
coverage that it received as a result, most likely led to public disapproval of BP. 
 
2010 BP Oil Spill vs. Exxon Valdez 
When comparing the 2010 BP Gulf oil spill to the infamous Exxon Valdez oil spill of 
1989, it appears that BP engaged in much of the same crisis management practices that its 
predecessor did. While BP did respond quickly after the initial explosion of the Deepwater 
Horizon rig, unlike Exxon’s non-insightful and slow response according to Johnson and Sellnow 
(1995), BP did employ the same unethical crisis responses, including denial, scapegoating, and 
evasion of responsibility. Additionally, just as Exxon took a proactive approach, discouraging 
increased government regulation of oil transportation in order to protect its assets, BP also took a 
Communicating During Crisis   57 
 
proactive approach openly communicating with the public and employing constant efforts to stop 
leaking oil valves.  
Overall, it is important to note that BP employed crisis management strategies considered 
effective and ethical more often than it did those considered unethical. While BP may have 
employed effective, ethical crisis communication strategies throughout most of the crisis and 
likely minimized the public’s dissatisfaction with the organization, negative public opinion of the 
company may have already been formed due to blunders and seemingly indifferent responses in 
the first stage of the crisis. BP’s unethical responses during the early state of the crisis may not 
have been the only reason that such negative public opinion formed, but rather the overall 
damaging environmental and economic impact that the crisis had upon individuals and 
businesses most likely accounted for a great deal of dissatisfaction with BP. Understanding the 
nature of media coverage, the degree of prominence given to coverage of the crisis, as well as 
crisis management response strategies employed by BP help to explain the public’s perception of 
the organization and its efforts to resolve the crisis, as well as help foreshadow BP’s future. 
 
Conclusion 
Crisis management and communications is an essential aspect of public relations, that 
while often overlooked or not given sufficient attention, can determine the overall success or 
failure of an organization. The ability for an organization to respond quickly and effectively 
during a crisis is imperative to repairing and protecting its reputation among the public. 
According to extant research of the agenda setting theory, the public develops perceptions of a 
particular event or crisis, as well as the organization that is involved, through media coverage. 
This perception is influenced by a variety of factors, including prominence given to media 
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coverage of such an event or organization; type, tone, and portrayal of an event or organization 
within media coverage; past organizational history and reputation among the public; as well as 
what action was taken by the organization to manage the event or crisis. These factors, in 
addition to countless others, contribute to shaping public perception of an organization caught in 
the middle of a crisis. Understanding how to effectively communicate with the public in times of 
crises in order to help affected publics, as well as protect reputation and financial livelihood is 
imperative to an organization and should be well-planned, executed, and evaluated. 
Crisis management and communication has emerged as an important field in public 
relations as crises are inevitable and effective management of such crises is crucial to the 
longevity of an organization. Scholarly research reveals that the process of crisis communication 
is comprised of three main stages: pre-crisis planning, crisis management during the time of a 
crisis, and post-crisis evaluation and learning. Preparation for a crisis is an integral aspect of 
effective crisis communication and is comprised of developing a crisis management plan, as well 
as monitoring for and training individuals within the organization how to respond to potential 
crises. Crisis management during the actual crisis is highly complex and includes quick and 
decisive, yet thoughtful action. There are various strategies and tactics that can be employed by 
an organization in crisis, some of which are ethical and some of which are not as described 
previously. In order to repair and protect an organization’s reputation among stakeholders, it is in 
an organization’s best interest to respond in a timely and ethical manner. Post-crisis evaluation 
takes place after a crisis is deemed resolved and involves reflection on behalf of the organization 
on their crisis management decisions, skills, and responses. This stage also serves as a tool for 
learning for an organization, as effective and ineffective crisis management responses are 
detected and adjusted for future potential crises.  
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 This study examined BP as a contemporary example of an organization’s efforts to 
manage a crisis and to protect, restore, and maintain its reputation among the public. In order to 
understand BP’s response to the 2010 Gulf oil crisis, as well as to evaluate the organization on 
whether or not the crisis management strategies that it chose to employ were effective and 
ethical, scholarly research in the field of crisis communication was studied and a content analysis 
was conducted. 
Major findings from the content analysis conducted on the 2010 BP Gulf oil spill reveal 
that BP was given a great deal of media coverage and prominence throughout the duration of the 
crisis in all three newspapers with a majority of articles appearing in the front (news) section, 
and many on the front page, of the newspapers. Media coverage was especially high during the 
first stage of the crisis (April 20-May 5) as the crisis was unexpected and newsworthy, as well as 
during the fourth stage of the crisis (July 21-29) as a cluster of significant events for BP’s 
organization, such as the announcement that former CEO Tony Hayward would be stepping 
down, occurred. Furthermore, BP executives and U.S. government officials/agencies were the 
most frequently cited or quoted sources found in media coverage, as these individuals are 
considered important and their opinions valued by the public as experts. Clean-up efforts, 
reported action taken by BP to manage the crisis, as well as criticism of BP’s management of the 
crisis were the primary topics most frequently addressed in this study. This reveals the public’s 
desire to know that action is being taken to remedy the crisis and shows the public’s overall 
dissatisfaction with BP’s efforts to manage the situation.  
While BP primarily employed crisis management response strategies considered ethical, 
such as updating the public in a clear, concise manner, a majority of the time, there were some 
instances when BP engaged in unethical strategies during the crisis. These unethical responses 
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most often were denial, scapegoating, and evasion of responsibility and were clustered at the 
beginning of the crisis (Stage 1—April 20-May 5), portraying the company as unorganized, 
unprepared, and lacking professionalism. While overall BP’s crisis responses may have been 
favorable, their initial reaction most likely negatively shaded the public’s perception of the 
organization for the rest of the crisis; this also may explain the high frequency of criticism of the 
company’s response found in media coverage. 
 Crisis communication is an important aspect of public relations as it can ultimately 
determine the success or failure of an organization, both financially and with the public. Crises 
are inevitable; therefore, it is imperative for organizations to be well-prepared, well-trained, and 
ready for when crises do strike. Effective and ethical crisis communication has the power to 
uphold an organization’s reputation with the public, as well as can protect an organization’s 
livelihood and support its overall success in the future.  
 
Implications 
 The present study of the 2010 BP oil spill crisis contributes to the field of crisis 
communication and public relations, as it highlights the significance of being proactive for all 
contingencies. PR practitioners must realize that crises are both inevitable and unexpected. The 
often unforeseen nature of crises calls for pre-crisis planning, training, and practice. Crisis 
communication is important to the field of public relations as an organization’s reputation, 
financial livelihood, and future success are in jeopardy during the time of a crisis. PR 
practitioners should understand that in order to protect an organization involved in a crisis, it is 
essential to have a crisis plan developed in advance. It is also vital for PR practitioners to work 
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with organizations to train individuals on how to execute their crisis communication plan, as well 
as practice this plan hypothetically to prepare for potential crises.  
Furthermore, electing a spokesperson for the organization and preparing messages to 
disseminate to the public in advance are important organizational steps that should be considered 
when planning and preparing for crises. It is the role of the PR practitioner to understand crisis 
communication as a discipline of public relations, including what constitutes effective and 
ethical crisis management practices, in order to ensure the preparedness and protection of an 
organization.  
This particular study revealed that even with a large multi-national company, professional 
crisis planning is lacking.  It seems few lessons were learned from the Exxon Valdez crisis, as 
the content analysis revealed similar blunders in communication by BP.  The most interesting 
finding is that BP made the most communication mistakes within the first two weeks of the 
crisis, the time in which companies should be most cautious and professional in their 
communications with external and internal publics. This is important for PR practitioners to note 
as it proves that pre-crisis planning and training is crucial. If BP’s PR team would have 
implemented a crisis communication plan and practiced executing it before the crisis arose, the 
organization may have been more prepared to handle the crisis effectively.  
Also, when BP employed unethical crisis management strategies, the most frequently 
occurring responses were denial, scapegoating, and evasion of responsibility. These particular 
unethical responses show BP’s lack of preparedness and professionalism. This is important for 
PR practitioners to note as there is a need not only to have a crisis communication plan 
developed before a crisis occurs, but also to prepare key messages that the organization would 
like to convey to the public and elect a spokesperson to disseminate these messages prior to a 
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crisis. Instead of reacting on instinct and trying to minimize the degree of responsibility an 
organization has in a crisis, as BP did during stage one of the Gulf oil spill crisis, the PR 
practitioner would have already worked with the organization to develop a course of action to 
respond to the situation that was consistent with strategies considered best practices in crisis 
communication. Furthermore, pre-crisis preparation of messages would allow an organization to 
express their concern and sympathy for damages caused by the crisis, especially when these 
damages include injury to humans. This emotional aspect should be considered by PR 
practitioners when developing and implementing crisis communication plans. 
This study also revealed that a great deal of media coverage, as well as prominence, was 
given to the 2010 BP Gulf oil spill. This is not out of the ordinary, as most crises generate media 
coverage due to their unexpectedness and often negative implications. This is important for PR 
practitioners to realize as it emphasizes the imperative to respond quickly and effectively to 
crises. It is of utmost significance for an organization to be well-prepared in advance for a 
potential crisis and to employ ethical crisis management strategies, as media coverage of such a 
crisis is likely to occur. Because the news is highly influential in shaping the public’s perception, 
it is crucial for an organization to receive positive media coverage as its reputation is on the line 
during times of crisis.  
 
Limitations 
 Although this study reveals noteworthy trends in the nature of media coverage regarding 
the 2010 BP Gulf oil spill and BP’s response to it, there are some limitations that must be taken 
into consideration. The small sample size for the content analysis conducted is one limitation, as 
only 164 articles were selected. This small number may not accurately capture the full range of 
Communicating During Crisis   63 
 
topics addressed and actions taken by BP throughout the crisis. Additionally, because only one 
international, one large national, and one local Gulf newspaper were examined, the study likely 
did not identify the wide range of BP responses and media coverage of such responses.  
 While variables and categories under each variable were carefully considered when 
developing the coding instrument, categories were not mutually exclusive. Categories that 
comprised the sources cited or quoted, topics addressed, primary topics addressed, and BP crisis 
management responses variables overlapped. Due to the complex nature of this study, coding 
these variables and categories was difficult and somewhat subjective to the coder’s reading and 
perceptions.  Although much effort was made to operationalize variables and train the second 
coder, some variables appeared to be problematic.  Thus, reliability, and thus validity, on some 
content may be challenged. Inter-coder reliability, as measured by Cohen’s Kappa, for several 
judged variables ranged from .57-.70, which is generally unacceptable reliability.  However, the 
majority of variables received scores between .77 and 1.0, indicating a high degree of reliability 
for most critical variables measured.  
 
Future Research 
 This study examined what constitutes ethical and effective crisis communication and 
examined crisis communication in the context of BP’s 2010 Gulf oil spill.  While this study 
revealed a lot about media’s portrayal of the BP oil spill, we do not know if the news coverage 
had any effects on people’s perceptions of BP.  Future research may consider public opinion 
about BP, in light of how it handled the oil spill in the Gulf. Public perceptions will reveal more 
accurately the overall effectiveness of BP’s crisis management efforts. 
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APPENDIX A: 
 
 
Code Sheet 
 
Newspaper (origin of article): 
1     The Times-Picayune 
2     The New York Times 
3     The Herald 
 
 
Year article published:  
2010 
 
 
Month article published: 
____ (1-12) 
 
 
Date article published: 
____ (1-31) 
 
 
Stage of Crisis: 
____ Stage 1 (April 20-May 5) 
____ Stage 2 (May 26-May 30) 
____ Stage 3 (June 18-June 26) 
____ Stage 4 (July 21-July 29) 
____ Stage 5(August 21-August 28) 
____  Stage 6 (September 18-September 23) 
 
 
Section of newspaper article published:  
1      Front Section 
2      Sports 
3      Arts & Entertainment 
4      Business 
5      Environment 
6      Politics 
7      Science 
8      Trade 
9      Weather 
10    Fashion & Style 
11    Opinion 
12    Health 
13    Technology 
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14    Education 
15    Metro 
16    Other________________ 
 
 
Page number article found on: 
_______ 
 
 
Word count of article: 
________ 
 
 
Sources cited or quoted within article: 
 
Yes (1) No (2)     
_____  _____    BP company spokesperson 
_____  _____    BP company official/executive 
_____  _____     BP employee  
_____  _____    U.S. government official or agency 
_____  _____    U.S. President 
_____  _____    U.K. government official or agency 
_____  _____    U.K. Prime Minister 
_____  _____      Local (Gulf) official 
_____  _____      Engineer 
_____  _____      Environmental scientist 
_____  _____     Environment activist 
_____  _____     Economist 
_____  _____      Citizen of Gulf region 
_____  _____     Industrial/Trade organization 
_____  _____      Gulf business leader, owner/manager 
_____  _____     Tourist of Gulf 
_____  _____      Health expert 
_____  _____     Veterinarian /animal scientist 
_____  _____     Emergency response worker 
_____   _____     Coast Guard 
_____  _____     Other___________________ 
 
 
 
Topics addressed in article: 
 
Yes (1) No (2) 
_____  _____     Impact on land, water, and/or plant life 
_____  _____     Impact on humans and/or animal life 
_____  _____     Clean-up processes or attempts to stop the spill 
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_____  _____    Government Comment 
_____  _____     Government Action/Policies  
_____  _____     Human interest 
_____  _____     Economic impact on Gulf tourism and local (Gulf) businesses 
_____  _____     Economic impact on BP stock and profits 
_____  _____     Economic impact on other national/international businesses or industries 
_____  _____     Comment made by BP 
_____  _____    Reported action taken by BP regarding management of the spill 
_____  _____     Criticism of BP’s crisis management response 
_____  _____     Other_______________ 
 
 
Primary article topic: 
 
Yes (1) No (2) 
_____  _____     Impact on land, water, and/or plant life 
_____  _____     Impact on humans and/or animal life 
_____  _____     Clean-up processes or attempts to stop the spill 
_____  _____    Government Comment 
_____  _____     Government Action/Policies  
_____  _____     Human interest 
_____  _____     Economic impact on Gulf tourism and local (Gulf) businesses 
_____  _____     Economic impact on BP stock and profits 
_____  _____     Economic impact on other national/international businesses or industries 
_____  _____     Comment made by BP 
_____  _____    Reported action taken by BP regarding crisis management 
_____  _____     Criticism of BP’s crisis management response 
_____  _____      Other_________________    
 
 
 
BP’s response/PR strategies employed: 
 
Yes (1) No (2) 
_____  _____     Attack of the accuser 
_____  _____    Denial  
_____  _____    Scapegoating 
_____  _____     Justification 
_____  _____    Compensation 
_____  _____    Ingratiation 
_____  _____    Victimage 
_____  _____      Evasion of responsibility 
_____  _____      Bolstering 
_____  _____    Minimization 
_____  _____      Differentiation 
_____  _____    Transcendence 
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_____  _____     Mortification 
_____  _____      Apology 
_____  _____    Timely response  
_____  _____    Acknowledgement of mistakes  
_____  _____    Clear, concise dissemination of message by BP spokesperson or official 
_____  _____    Expressing concern and sympathy for impact 
_____  _____    Updating the public or stakeholders on the situation/recovery efforts 
_____  _____    “No Comment” used by BP spokesperson or official 
_____  _____      Other______________ 
 
 
 
Unethical Response by BP: 
 
Yes (1) No (2) 
______ ______ 
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APPENDIX B: 
 
 
Code Sheet Definitions 
 
 
Sources cited or quoted within article: 
 
BP company spokesperson- selected individual(s) chosen to speak on behalf of the organization 
 
BP company official/executive – board members, Executive VP; Executive Director; Chief 
Financial Officer; Chief Executive, Refining and Marketing; Executive VP, Human Resources; 
Group General Counsel, BP plc; Group Chief Executive 
 
BP employee- rig worker, site manger, project manager, secretary, etc.  
 
U.S. government official or agency –Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Commerce, 
Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Health and Human Services, members of Congress, Supreme 
Court Justices, Minerals Management Services, Environmental Protection Agency etc. 
 
U.S. President- Barak Obama 
 
U.K. government official or agency – MPs, members of the House of Lords, The House of 
Commons Commission, Office of the Chief Executive, etc.  
 
U.K. Prime Minister- David Cameron 
 
Local (Gulf) official – governors of states, lt. governors, attorney generals of states, heads of 
state departments (education, transportation, etc.), state representatives, mayors of cities, county 
clerks, director of tourism, etc. 
 
Engineer- bio (medical) engineer, chemical engineer, civil engineer, ocean engineer, 
mineral/mining engineer, mechanical engineer, etc.  
 
Environmental scientist – ecologist, geologist, environmental chemist, environmental physicist, 
oceanographer, etc.  
 
Environmental activist- member or official from environmental groups such as the PETA, the 
Sierra Club, etc.  
 
Economist- accountant, investor, financial analyst, banker, etc.  
 
Citizen of Gulf region- individual(s) living in states in the Gulf region of the U.S such as 
Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, the Florida pan-handle, etc.  
 
Industrial/Trade Organization-oil industry organizations, fishing industry organizations, etc.  
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Gulf business leader, owner/manager- Chamber of Commerce, hotel owner/manager, clothing or 
souvenir shop owner, etc.  
 
Tourist of the Gulf- individual(s) who visit, but do not permanently live in the Gulf region of the 
U.S. 
Health expert – doctor, nurse, surgeon, etc.  
 
Veterinarian/animal scientist- marine biologist, zoologist, ornithologist, etc. 
 
Emergency response worker – paramedic, FEMA employee/volunteer, Red Cross 
employee/volunteer, etc.  
 
Coast Guard- reserve or full-time individual(s) serving in the Coast Guard as officers, admirals, 
investigators, etc. 
 
*note: these categories are not mutually exclusive 
 
 
 
Topics addressed in article and primary topic addressed in article: 
 
***primary topic – main issue addressed in the headline and first two paragraphs 
 
Impact on land, water, and/or plant life – pollution (water or beach), harm or destruction to 
plants, etc. 
 
Impact on humans and/or animal life- destruction of wildlife species, oil-covered birds or sea 
mammals, injured rig workers, etc. 
 
Clean-up processes or attempts to stop the spill – use of new technology/engineering on valves 
or pipes, efforts to clean beaches or animals, etc.  
 
Government comment – statement made by a federal, state, or local government official  
 
Government action/policies – action taken by federal , state, or local governments, 
implementation of laws or policies, etc. 
 
Human interest – features on residents of the Gulf area, features on specific 
businesses/organizations in the Gulf area, opinion pieces, etc.  
 
Economic impact on Gulf tourism and local businesses – related to loss or gain of profits for 
tourist associated businesses such as restaurants, hotels, tourist attractions; related to an increase 
or decline in the number of individuals traveling to the region; opinions of tourists or business 
owners/managers in the area, etc.  
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Economic impact on BP stock and profits - related to the cost/money spent on clean-up and 
recovery, loss or gain of profits for BP, changes in BP’s stock price, etc.  
 
Economic impact on national and international businesses – related to the loss or gain of profits 
for large scale businesses whose reach extends beyond the Gulf region, etc.  (i.e.: fishing 
industry) 
 
Comment made by BP – BP employee, executive/official, or spokesperson provides a statement, 
but no action accompanies comment 
 
Reported action taken by BP regarding management of the spill– BP actions or claims that it is 
acting to fix the problem/resolve situation, action taken to clean up spill/seal valve, 
compensation paid by BP to individuals and businesses affected by the spill, etc. 
 
Criticism of BP’s crisis management response – negative comments regarding BP’s 
response/handling of problem/situation  
 
*note: these categories are not mutually exclusive 
 
 
 
BP’s response/PR strategies employed: 
 
Attack of the accuser – reduce the credibility of another, degrade another 
 
Denial – claim that BP not responsible for a particular statement, act, accident, or response 
 
Scapegoating – blame another person or reason outside of BP for act/accident 
 
Justification – attempt to justify (show/prove response or act was reasonable and right) 
act/accident 
 
Compensation – reimburse victim 
 
Ingratiation - attempt to gain favor with somebody by deliberate efforts; to portray self in 
positive light in order to gain favor/support among others 
 
Victimage – portray self as victim of accident/act rather than take responsibility 
 
Evasion of responsibility – claim that response was in response to another act (provocation), 
event occurred because lack of information or ability (defeasibility), claim act was a mishap 
(accident), claim that act was originally done with good intentions 
 
Bolstering – emphasize good actions/responses in order to overshadow bad responses 
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Minimization – claim that act or accident was not that serious, downplay significant of a 
particular act 
 
Differentiation – compare act/accident to another and downplay its offensiveness 
 
Transcendence – draw attention to issues that are considered more important in order to justify 
act/accident rather than to the accident/crisis as a whole 
 
Mortification – express regret and ask forgiveness for a particular statement or act without 
accepting responsibility for the situation/crisis as a whole 
 
Apology – acknowledge mistake, express regret, and ask forgiveness for the situation/crisis as a 
whole 
 
Timely response – appears to answer questions and take action quickly, no delay in response 
 
Acknowledgement of mistakes – admit shortcomings/problems without offering a sincere 
apology for them, self-criticism without apology 
 
Clear, concise dissemination of message by BP spokesperson or official– consistent content, 
jargon-free, etc.  
 
Expressing concern and sympathy for impact- acknowledge negative consequences of crisis in a 
considerate manner but do not full apologize for the situation 
 
Updating the public or stakeholders on the situation/recovery efforts – announcements/releases 
offered by BP, regular communication apparent 
 
“No comment” used by BP spokesperson or official- refuse to issue a statement or answer to the 
press or other organizations/individuals when asked about a specific topic 
 
*note: these categories are not mutually exclusive 
 
 
 
Unethical response by BP: 
 
The following crisis communication strategies are considered unethical for this study: 
 
Attack of the accuser, denial, scapegoating, evasion of responsibility, minimization, bolstering, 
transcendence, ingratiation, justification, victimage, differentiation, mortification, “No 
comment” 
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APPENDIX C: 
 
Tables of Frequencies and Chi Square Results 
 
 
Table 8: Newspaper Source Articles Published In 
 
Newspaper: Number of Articles: 
Times-Picayune 87 (53 %) 
New York Times 54 (32.9%) 
Herald 23 (14 %) 
Total: 164 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: Month Article Published 
 
Month Article 
Published: 
Number of Articles: 
April 14 (8.5 %) 
May 38 (23.2 %) 
June 18 (11 %) 
July 44 (26.8 %) 
August 37 (22.6 %) 
September 13 (7.9 %) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10: Publication of Articles During Different Stages of the Crisis 
 
Stage of Crisis: Number of Articles: 
Stage 1 (April 20-May 5) 45 (27.4 %) 
Stage 2 (May 26-May 30) 7 (4.3 %) 
Stage 3 (June 18-June 26) 18 (11 %) 
Stage 4 (July 21-July 29) 44 (26.8 %) 
Stage 5 (August 21-August 28) 37 (22.6 %) 
Stage 6 (September 18-September 23) 13 (7.9 %) 
 
 
 
 
 
Communicating During Crisis   73 
 
Table 11: Section of the Newspaper Article Published In 
 
Section of Newspaper 
Article Found In: 
Number of Articles: 
1 (Front Section) 107 (65.2 %) 
2 (Sports) 2 (1.2 %) 
4 (Business) 9 (5.5 %) 
15 (Metro) 12 (7.3 %) 
16 (Other) 10 (6.1 %) 
 
 
 
 
Table 12: Page Number Article Located On 
 
Page Number Article 
Found On: 
Number of Articles: 
1 50 (30.5 %) 
2 5 (3 %) 
3 5 (3 %) 
4 12 (7.3 %) 
5 6 (3.7 %) 
6 8 (4.9 %) 
7 5 (3 %) 
8 1 (0.6 %) 
9 5 (3 %) 
10 7 (4.3 %) 
11 4 (2.4 %) 
12 5 (3 %) 
13 2 (1.2 %) 
14 6 (3.7 %) 
15 2 (1.2 %) 
16 1 (0.6 %) 
17 2 (1.2 %) 
18 3 (1.8 %) 
19 1 (0.6 %) 
20 1 (0.6 %) 
22 1 (0.6 %) 
23 1 (0.6 %) 
26 1 (0.6 %) 
30 2 (1.2 %) 
31 1 (0.6 %) 
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Table 13: Word Count of Articles 
 
 Total Number 
of Articles 
Minimum 
Number of 
Words 
Maximum 
Number of 
Words 
Mean Number 
of Words 
Standard 
Deviation 
Number of 
Words in 
Article 
164 64 5401 833.66 525.68 
 
*** Note: For all tables, any variables not listed occurred zero times in the 164 articles  
 
 
 
 
Table 14: Chi Square Results-Significant Difference in Sources Cited or Quoted 
 
Source Cited or 
Quoted Within 
Article: 
Χ2 df p value 
BP executive or 
official 
7.70 2 .02* 
Economist 6.37 2 .04* 
U.K Prime Minister 7.27 2 .02* 
Local (Gulf) official 27.68 2 .00*** 
 
*p < .05 
** p < .01  
*** p < .001 
 
 
 
 
Table 15: Chi Square Results-Significant Difference in Topics Addressed Within Articles 
 
Topic Addressed Within 
Article: 
Χ2 df p value 
Economic impact on BP 
stock and profits 
24.26 2 .00*** 
Comment made by BP 9.93 2 .01** 
Reported action taken by 
BP to manage the spill 
8.58 2 .01* 
 
*p < .05 
** p < .01  
*** p < .001 
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Table 16: Chi Square Results-Significant Difference in Primary Topics Addressed Within 
Articles 
 
Primary Topic 
Addressed Within 
Article: 
Χ2 df p value 
Government 
action/policies 
7.55 2 .02* 
Economic impact on 
Gulf tourism or local 
Gulf businesses 
5.02 2 .08 
Economic impact on 
BP stock and profits 
16.61 2 .00*** 
Economic impact on 
other 
national/international 
businesses/industries 
5.41 2 .07 
Comment made by BP 7.27 2 .03* 
 
*p < .05 
** p < .01  
*** p < .001 
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